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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from the summary dismissal of Mr. Ramiro Ramirez's first successive 
petition for post-conviction relief. The order of summary dismissal should be reversed and the 
case remanded for further proceedings for three reasons: 1) the district court erred in failing to 
appoint counsel; 2) the district court erred in summarily dismissing given no answer or other 
indication from the state that it objected to the request for post-conviction relief; and 3) the 
district court erred in concluding that Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389,327 P.3d 365 (2014), 
applied to this case as Mr. Ramirez has never been afforded post-conviction counsel and thus has 
never had any meaningful opportunity to have his claims heard. 
B. Procedural History and Statement of Facts 
On July 12, 2008, Mr. Ramirez and a co-defendant were found guilty of burglary and 
acquitted of aiding and abetting aggravated assault and aiding and abetting attempted robbery. 
Mr. Ramirez appealed. R 22. 
The State Appellate Public Defender (SAPD) was appointed and two issues were raised 
on appeal: 1) whether the court erred in denying a motion for a mistrial; and 2) whether the 
sentence imposed was excessive. Relief was denied in an unpublished opinion. State v. 
Ramirez, 2011 Unpublished Opinion No. 44 7. R 22. 1 
Mr. Ramirez filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief along with a motion for 
appointment of counsel. Mr. Ramirez raised claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel 
1 The district court took judicial notice of this opinion and the opinion in the appeal from 
the original post-conviction dismissal in this post-conviction case. R 36. Mr. Ramirez has filed 
a motion to augment the record in this appeal with those opinions. 
for failure to raise several issues in direct appeal, including district court error in denying Mr. 
Ramirez's motion to suppress the victims' "identifications" of himself and the co-defendant 
because of unduly suggestive identification procedures. The district court denied the request for 
counsel and summarily dismissed the petition. R 22. 
Mr. Ramirez appealed and relief was denied in an unpublished opinion. Ramirez v. State, 
2014 Unpublished Opinion No. 401, filed March 3, 2014. R 22. 
On May 30, 2014, Mr. Ramirez filed a successive petition for post-conviction relief. R 3-
11. He raised this claim: 
RS. 
I assert that the district court erred in allowing the state to elicit testimony of my 
co-defendant's refusal to talk to police at the scene of the arrest and I contend that 
the error was not harmless. Therefore, counsel ignored issues that are clearly 
stronger than those presented in my appeal post-conviction appeal. 
Mr. Ramirez accompanied his petition with an affidavit, R 8-11, setting out the error in 
the trial court and requesting the appointment of counsel "to give me an opportunity with counsel 
to properly allege the necessary supporting facts for my claim, because I lack the skills and 
knowledge to represent myself. Thank you very much." R 11. 
Mr. Ramirez also filed a separate motion and affidavit in support for appointment of 
counsel. R 12-15. 
The state never filed an answer or any other document in the case. R 2. 
The court filed a notice of intent to dismiss. R 21-28. In the notice, the court took 
judicial notice of the unpublished opinion issued on direct appeal and the unpublished opinion 
issued on the appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief. The court also denied counsel for 
2 
this successive petition writing: 
R25. 
The petitioner's successive petition alleges that the trial court erred in allowing 
admission of statements of his co-defendant and that the attorney who handled the 
appeal of the dismissal of his original post-conviction relief petition was 
ineffective in failing to raise that issue on appeal. The petition is raising for the 
first time an issue that could have been presented and was not raised in his 
original petition. The petitioner has not presented any sufficient reason as to why 
he did not raise this issue in his original petition for post-conviction relief. 
Therefore, the court must find the second successive petition to be frivolous and 
there is no legal basis for the appointment of counsel. The Motion for 
Appointment of Counsel is DENIED. 
With regard to its intent to summarily dismiss the petition, the court first wrote that the 
petitioner's claims were untimely because Mr. Ramirez had failed to set forth "sufficient 
reasons" as to why his claims had not been raised or were inadequately raised in his initial 
petition. R 26. 
The court then stated that Mr. Ramirez was alleging ineffective assistance of post-
conviction counsel. The court stated that it would summarily dismiss this claim because 1) there 
is no constitutionally protected right to effective assistance of counsel in post-conviction; 2) the 
claim of error in allowing testimony at trial regarding the co-defendant's statements "was not 
preserved for appeal of the dismissal of his 2012 petition for post-conviction relief. ... An 
allegation of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is not a cognizable ground for relief 
under the UPCP A."; and 3) "since the petitioner failed to raise the issue of the district court's 
error relative to the testimony of the statements of the co-defendant in his original petition, there 
was no issue reserved for appeal on the denial of his original petition for post-conviction relief." 
R27. 
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Mr. Ramirez filed a timely response which he labeled "Motion to Reply Notice oflntent 
to Dismiss." R 30-32. In his response, Mr. Ramirez stated: 
... I seek modification with my motion to respond. With this motion to respond I 
would like to correct allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, of prior post-
conviction appeal. 
The allegations for ineffective assistance of counsel are due to my direct appeal 
counsel. I was unclear with the procedures of my second successive petition. 
Therefore, I pray the court can disregard the allegations of inffective [sic] 
assistance of counsel, of prior post-conviction appeal. 
Therefore, the reason for not asserting the grounds in the earlier petition is 
because I didn't know of these grounds at the time of first petition. I also lack the 
skills and knowledge to represent myself, and with limited access to legal 
material. However, I didn't have an attorney to represent me in the proceeding, to 
provide a post-conviction application with meaningful opportunity to have my 
claims presented, and to help me point out errors. 
R 30-31. 
Mr. Ramirez closed his response with a second request for counsel "in order to give me 
an opportunity with counsel to properly allege the necessary supporting facts. Thank you very 
much." R 32. 
The district court thereafter issued its memorandum decision and order summarily 
dismissing Mr. Ramirez's petition. R 33-40. 
The court first stated as a basis for dismissal that from his response, it appeared that Mr. 
Ramirez wished to "amend his petition to allege ineffective assistance of his appellate counsel on 
his direct appeal and not as to his appellate counsel on his post-conviction appeal." R 34. The 
court held that "to the extent that the petitioner seeks to amend his successive petition," the 
request was "without merit" and was denied. Citing Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681, 686-87, 
978 P .2d 241, 246-4 7 ( Ct. App. 1999), the court noted that to raise additional issues, an amended 
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petition must be filed. The court then stated in a footnote that even if it were to consider a claim 
of ineffective assistance of direct appeal counsel, the claim would be untimely and forfeited 
because it was not raised in the initial petition. R 3 7. 
The court then dismissed Mr. Ramirez's petition writing that Mr. Ramirez was aware of 
any error in allowing in identification evidence at the time of the trial and that he was aware of 
the issues raised on appeal at the time of appeal. Therefore, the court concluded, "The petitioner 
had a meaningful opportunity to assert all claims he wanted to assert in his original petition. A 
mere lack of knowledge of the law is not a sufficient reason as to why this claim was not 
presented in his original petition." The court cited Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389,327 P.3d 365 
(2014), in a footnote in support of its decision. R 39. 
While the court noted that it had denied the first request for counsel subject to 
reconsideration, the court did not ever specifically deny or acknowledge the second request for 
counsel included in the response to the notice of intent to summarily dismiss. R 33. 
A final judgment was entered. R 42. This appeal timely follows. R 44-48. 
III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Did the district court err in failing to appoint counsel? 
B. Did the district court err in summarily dismissing in the absence of any answer or 
other document filed by the state? 
C. Did the district court err in dismissing the successive petition given Mr. Ramirez 
never had a meaningful opportunity to present his claims? 
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IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court Erred in Refusing to Appoint Counsel 
Mr. Ramirez requested appointment of counsel twice - once when he filed his petition 
and again in his response to the notice of intent to summarily dismiss. The court denied the first 
request in its notice of intent to dismiss. In its memorandum decision and order of summary 
dismissal, the court recognized its earlier denial of counsel but did not acknowledge or 
specifically deny the second request for counsel. The district court's failure to appoint counsel 
was, however, error because Mr. Ramirez did set forth facts giving rise to the possibility of a 
valid post-conviction claim. 
If a post-conviction petitioner is unable to pay for legal representation, counsel may be 
appointed at public expense. I.C. § 19-4904. Although the decision to grant or deny counsel is 
discretionary, counsel should be appointed if the petitioner qualifies financially and "alleges facts 
to raise the possibility of a valid claim." Juddv. State, 148 Idaho 22, 24,218 P.3d 1, 3 (Ct. App. 
2009), quoting Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 794, 102 P.3d 1108, 1113 (2004). See also, 
Plantv. State, 143 Idaho 758, 761, 152 P.3d 629,632 (Ct. App. 2006). 
In assessing whether the possibility of a valid claim has been raised, the district court 
must afford leniency to prose petitioners whose petitions may be inartful and incomplete. Plant, 
143 Idaho at 761, 152 P.3d at 632. 
[T]he trial court should keep in mind that petitions and affidavits filed by a pro se 
petitioner will often be conclusory and incomplete. Although facts sufficient to 
state a claim may not be alleged because they do not exist, they also may not be 
alleged because the prose petitioner simply does not know what are the essential 
elements of the claim. 
Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793, 102 P .3 d at 1 I 11 . 
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Every inference is to be drawn in favor of the pro se petitioner who cannot be expected to 
know how to properly allege the necessary facts. Plant, supra. A prose petitioner need not 
allege facts to support every element of a valid claim to obtain counsel; rather, it is sufficient to 
have alleged facts supporting some of the elements of a valid claim. Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 
676,679, 23 P.3d 138, 141 (2001), superseded in part by statute as stated in Charboneau v. State, 
140 Idaho at 792 ftnt. 1, 102 P.3d at 1111, ftnt. 1. 
The decision on whether to appoint counsel and the decision of whether to summarily 
dismiss a petition are governed by two different standards. Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651, 654-
55, 152, P.3d 12, 15-16 (2007). In determining whether to appoint counsel, the court considers 
only whether there is a possibility of a valid claim, considering circumstances which might 
prevent the petitioner from making a more complete investigation into the facts. In a decision of 
the merits, the court must consider whether a claim has been made. Id 
In this case, Mr. Ramirez alleged error in the admission of testimony regarding his co-
defendant's refusal to talk to the police. Both the Fifth Amendment as applied to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment and Article I, Section 13, of the Idaho Constitution guarantee 
a criminal defendant the right not to be compelled to testify against himself. This right also bars 
a prosecutor from commenting on a defendant's invocation of that right. Grifin v. California, 
360 U.S. 609,614 (1965). A prosecutor may not use evidence of post-arrest, post-Miranda 
silence for either impeachment, Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 (1975), or as substantive 
evidence of guilt in the State's case-in-chief, Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284,292 
(1986). See also, Stale v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 60,253 P.3d 727, 734 (2011). If the evidence 
presented regarding the co-defendant's invocation of the constitutional right to remain silent 
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could be imputed by the jury to Mr. Ramirez, then presentation of the evidence would have been 
improper. And, if this evidence was improperly admitted, there is both a possibility of 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel as well as a possibility of ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel, if the error amounted to fundamental error. See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,245 P.3d 
961 (2010). 
State v. Major, 105 Idaho 4,665 P.2d 703 (Ct. App. 1983), is instructive. In Major, the 
prosecutor called a witness to the stand who claimed his Fifth Amendment privilege. While the 
Court did not find fundamental error given the particular facts of Major's case, the Court noted 
that reversible error does occur when the witness is an accomplice of the defendant, this fact was 
known to the jury, the prosecutor knew the witness would claim his Fifth Amendment right, and 
the prosecutor persisted in asking questions regarding the crime with which the defendant was 
charged. The Court cited Robbins v. Small, 371 F.2d 793 (1 st Cir. 1967), cert. denied 386 U.S. 
1033, 87 S.Ct. 1483; United States v. King, 461 F.2d 53 (8th Cir. 1972); Shockley v. State, 335 
So.2d 269 (Ala. Cr. App. 1975), ajf'd 335 So.2d 663 (Ala. 1976); People v. Giacalone, 399 
Mich. 642, 250 N.W.2d 492 (Mich. 1977). 
Moreover, it is clearly erroneous to allow evidence of postarrest silence to be admitted at 
trial for the purpose ofraising an inference of guilt. State v. White, 97 Idaho 708, 551 P.2d 1344 
(1976). Even using the evidence for impeachment purposes is a due process violation. Doyle v. 
Ohio, 426 U.S. 610,618, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 2245 (1976). See also, State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 
821, 965 P.2d 174, 181 (1998) (Fifth Amendment rights are applicable pre-arrest and pre-
Miranda2 warnings and evidence of the exercise of the rights may not be admitted to imply 
2 Afiranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (I 966). 
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guilt); State v. Timmons, 145 Idaho 279, 290-91, 178 P.3d 644, 655-56 (Ct. App. 2007) (the 
defendant's exercise of the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent either before or after arrest 
may not be used in the state's case-in-chief for the purpose of inferring guilt.) 
In his affidavit in support of his petition, Mr. Ramirez stated that his co-defendant, Mr. 
Digiallonardo, declined to speak with the police when their car was stopped by police. Counsel 
for Mr. Digiallonardo objected to admission of evidence of Mr. Digiallonardo's exercise of his 
Fifth Amendment rights at the joint trial. Even though the court ordered that such testimony not 
be admitted, the prosecutor elicited the prohibited testimony from the police officer at trial. R 
66-67. Mr. Ramirez stated in his affidavit that the state had conceded that eliciting this 
testimony was error. R 66. And, indeed, State v. Digiallonardo, No. 35755, Unpublished Court 
of Appeals' Opinion issued November 5, 2010, confirms this allegation. At page 2 of the 
opinion, the Court of Appeals states, "The state concedes that allowing the state to elicit 
testimony regarding Digiallondardo's pre-Miranda silence was error." The Court went on to 
hold that even if the error had not been properly preserved, the error was fundamental error under 
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 245 P.3d 961 (2010), because there was a reasonable probability 
that the error affected the outcome of the trial. Mr. Digiallonardo's conviction from the joint trial 
was thus vacated. 
Mr. Ramirez paraphrased language from the Court of Appeals' conclusion in its decision 
in Digiallonardo (Slip Op. page 4) in his affidavit: 
I assert that the nature of the erroneously admitted evidence was especially 
damaging in that unlike most erroneous admissions of evidence of a defendant's 
silence, it allowed the jury to make two potentially harmful inferences of guilt 
based both on my co-defendant's refusal to talk to the officer and also his 
9 
R66. 
indication as to why he was refusing to talk. 3 This fact, combined with the 
relatively inconclusive nature of the evidence linking me and my co-defendant to 
the crime, leaves a reasonable possiblity that the erroneously admitted evidence 
contributed to the verdict - and thus I conclude it was not harmless error. 
Mr. Ramirez's allegation was sufficient to establish the possibility of a valid claim, both 
as to ineffective assistance of his trial counsel in any failure to object to this error and as to his 
direct appeal counsel in failing to raise the error on appeal. Therefore, counsel should have been 
appointed. Swader, supra. 
B. The District Court Erred in Dismissing the Petition in the Absence of Any Answer 
or Other Pleading or Argument from the State 
The state filed nothing in this case - no answer, no motion for summary dismissal, no 
briefs. 
The purpose of the requirement that the state file an answer within 30 days of the filing of 
the petition, LC. § 19-4906, is so that any factual and legal issues before the district court can be 
properly framed, thus allowing the district court to make an intelligent ruling on the petition. 
Fetterly v. State, 121 Idaho 417,418,825 P.2d 1073, 1074 (1991). "When the state fails to 
respond the district court is operating without the benefit of such pleadings and is placed in the 
indefensible position of ruling on an application for post-conviction relief without any factual or 
legal issues first being framed." Cherniwchan v. State, 99 Idaho 128, 130 n. 2, 578 P.2d 244, 
246 n. 2 ( 1978). 
3 According to the Digiallonardo opinion, testimony was elicited that Mr. Digiallonardo 
told the officer that he did not want to speak with him because he had overheard a conversation 
on the patrol car radio indicating "the event that happened in Jerome and the connection of why 
we had stopped him." Slip Op. page 2. 
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Moreover, a pleading by the state is necessary if the state wishes to controvert any 
allegations in the petition. "Until controverted by the state, the allegations are deemed to be 
true." Noel v. State, 113 Idaho 92, 94, 741 P.2d 728, 730 (Ct. App. 1987). Uncontroverted 
allegations "must be deemed to be true, no matter how incredible they may appear to the trial 
court or to this [appellate] Court." Smith v. State, 94 Idaho 469,472,491 P.2d 733, 736 (1971), 
overruled on other grounds by Kraft v. State, l 00 Idaho 671, 603 P .2d 1005 ( 1979). See also, 
Parrott v. State, 117 Idaho 272,275, 787 P.2d 258,260 (1990), noting that unrebutted allegations 
must be accepted as true. 
The difficulty posed by the lack of a state's pleading is compounded when the state also 
fails, as it did here, to comply with LC. § 19-4906(a), which provides: "If the application is not 
accompanied by the record of the proceedings challenged therein, the respondent shall file with 
its answer the record of portions thereof that are material to the questions raised in the 
application." The lack of the proper record cannot be attributed to the petitioner and the lack of 
a record can require vacation of a grant of summary dismissal. Rodriguez v. State, 122 Idaho 20, 
22, 830 P.2d 531, 533 (Ct. App. 1992), superseded on other grounds by statute. See Follinus v. 
State, 127 Idaho 897,908 P.2d 590 (Ct. App. 1995). 
In this case, Mr. Ramirez alleged error in the admission of testimony regarding his co-
defendant's refusal to talk to the police and error in the failure of appellate counsel to raise the 
issue as a matter of fundamental error. R 5. In his affidavit, Mr. Ramirez alleged that the state 
had conceded error in admission of the testimony. R 8. Mr. Ramirez further alleged, and noted 
that the state had not argued differently, that admission of the testimony was fundamental error. 
R 9. Mr. Ramirez further alleged that the error was not harmless because the co-defendant's 
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silence could have been viewed by the jury as evidence of a guilty conscience which provided a 
critical link in a case against Mr. Ramirez which was entirely circumstantial. Mr. Ramirez 
alleged, "I characterize the statements as highly incriminating as they 'implied guilt by informing 
the jury that my co-defendant wished to remain silent because he knew he was being investigated 
in connection with the incident at Dominos. "' R 8-9. Mr. Ramirez further alleged: 
R 10. 
Notably, the women never identified me or my co-defendant as one of the 
perpetrators. This is especially apparent given the discrepancies between the 
women's descriptions of the perpetrators and their vehicle and the characteristics 
of me and my co-defendant, that both of the perpetrators were initially identified 
as Hispanic, that clothes worn by the perpetrators were different from those worn 
by me and my co-defendant when we were stopped, and that there were various 
descriptions of the type of car driven by the perpetrators compared to the Honda 
that me and my co-defendant were stopped in. In addition, the weapon and masks 
or bandanas alleged used in the incident were never found - either in me or my co-
defendant's vehicle or along the route that we would have taken from Dominos to 
the location where we were stopped by police. 
I assert that the nature of the erroneously admitted evidence was especially 
damaging in that unlike most erroneous admissions of evidence of a defendant's 
silence, it allowed the jury to make two potentially harmful inferences of guilt 
based both on my co-defendant's refusal to talk to the officer and also his 
indication as to why he was refusing to talk. This fact, combined with the 
relatively inconclusive nature of the evidence linking me and my co-defendant to 
the crime, leaves a reasonable possibility that the erroneously admitted evidence 
contributed to the verdict - and thus I conclude it was not harmless error. 
Given none of these allegations are disputed, the state's concession of error must be taken 
as fact. Noel, supra; Smith supra. That leaves only the question of harmlessness. With regard to 
that analysis, Mr. Ramirez's allegations that the evidence against him was all weak and 
circumstantial, including that neither he nor the car could be linked to the offense by the 
witnesses' testimony must likewise be taken as true and agreed to by the state. Id 
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This situation is like that presented in Rodriguez v. State, supra. In Rodriguez, based 
upon the record presented by the petitioner's allegations, the appellate court was compelled to 
vacate the district court's order of dismissal. In Rodriguez, vacation was required because 
Rodriguez had alleged that he was not informed of the mandatory minimum sentence and the 
state failed to controvert the allegation. Here, Mr. Ramirez has alleged that the state has 
conceded error and further that the record supports a finding that the error was not harmless. The 
state has not controverted these allegations or provided a record to disprove the allegations and 
therefore summary dismissal was inappropriate. Id. 
C. The District Court Erred in Dismissing the Successive Petition Given Mr. Ramirez 
Never Had a Meaningful Opportunity to Present His Claims 
The district court dismissed Mr. Ramirez's petition on the basis that he failed to establish 
a sufficient reason for filing a successive petition. R 38. In particular, the court ruled that Mr. 
Ramirez had a meaningful opportunity to present all of his claims in his original petition and 
citing Murphy noted that he could not file a successive petition based upon the ineffective 
assistance of prior post-conviction appellate counsel. The district court's conclusion is flawed 
because Mr. Ramirez did not have the constitutionally required meaningful opportunity to 
present his claims. 
The state does not have to provide any means of collateral review. Nonetheless if the 
state does chose, as Idaho has, to allow collateral review, that review must be conducted in 
accord with the constitutional requirements of due process and equal protection. Evitts v. Lucey, 
469 U.S. 387,401, 105 S.Ct. 830,839 (1985). "[W]hen a State opts to act in a field where its 
action has significant discretionary elements, it must nonetheless act in accord with the dictates 
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of the Constitution-and, in particular, in accord with the Due Process Clause." Id 
"'Due process' emphasizes fairness between the State and the individual dealing with the 
State." Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 609, 94 S.Ct. 2437, 2443 (1974). "[F]undamental fairness 
entitles indigent defendant to 'an adequate opportunity to present their claims fairly within the 
adversary system."' Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 1093 (1985)(citation 
omitted). 
Here, looking to Murphy, the district court held that Mr. Ramirez had enjoyed a 
meaningful opportunity to present his claims given he filed an initial petition. However, Murphy 
dealt only with a case wherein the petitioner had counsel appointed to assist her in both her initial 
and successive petitions. In this case, Mr. Ramirez never had any counsel appointed to assist him 
in either his first or successive petition. 
As discussed above, Charboneau notes that prose petitioners may fail to state their 
claims sufficiently because such claims cannot be sufficiently raised or because the claims are 
sufficient but the petitioner lacks the skill and knowledge needed to properly state them. In no 
way can it be said that a pro se petitioner has had a meaningful opportunity to present his claims 
when he has never been granted counsel to assist in raising the claims in a properly drafted 
petition. Murphy does not apply to this case. The application of Murphy to dismiss this petition 
is especially egregious given that Mr. Ramirez's co-defendant, tried jointly with him, had his 
conviction vacated based upon the error Mr. Ramirez is trying to present as a prose litigant. 
This is not a case wherein there is no valid claim at issue. Mr. Ramirez's allegations were 
sufficient to establish a reason under I.C. § 19-4908 to allow a successive petition. Given the 
failure to ever appoint counsel, dismissal of Mr. Ramirez's successive petition is in contravention 
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of the requirements of fundamental fairness and due process. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Mr. Ramirez asks that this Court reverse the order of 
summary dismissal and remand for further proceedings. 
t! 
Respectfully submitted this,,_3,_. day of February, 2015. 
Deborah Whipple 
Attorney for Ramiro Ram rez 
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